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This paper involves a study to investigate the association between pledging policies by the government and financial performance of cassava product manufacturers in Thailand. A polynomial regression model is constructed to describe a key financial performance measure using a set of control variables and pledging policy variables. The control variables are obtained from financial statements of 58 starch manufacturers and 8 ethanol manufacturers that solely use fresh cassava roots as raw material during 2009-2014. Result from the model suggests an appropriate agricultural policy for the cassava product industry in Thailand.








Cassava is one of the most important economic crops of Thailand. Thailand is the World’s largest cassava products exporter, having an export value of $2,490 million in 2013, followed by Vietnam ($518.12 million) [8]. China is the World’s biggest cassava importer ($2,677 million) [8]. Major demand of cassava chips is driven by China, which uses cassava for ethanol, liquor, citric acid, and feed productions. Since 2002, ethanol and liquor consumption in China resulted in a rise in demand for cassava chips, which increased the cassava chip production to 27 million tons in 2009 [5]. China uses cassava chips as a substitute product of corn for ethanol production. When corn price decreases, cassava chip price is forced to decrease accordingly, which adversely affects Thai




Another important negative consequences from the pledging policy are corruptions among stakeholders (i.e., cassava farmers, manufacturers, and government officials. Moreover, farmers also harvested cassava roots earlier than usual to pledge to the government which affected the price and quality of the roots. Nevertheless, the Thai government set the pledging policy again in 2011/12 and 2012/13 [3]. The average pledging prices of fresh cassava roots were 2.825 baht/kg in 2012 and 2.675 baht/kg in 2013 [6,7].
Laiprakobsup [11] suggested that the Thai government should not intervene the agricultural market via pledging policy (which was implemented as a type of populist policy) but should promote a market oriented policy instead. Poramacom et al. [15] stated that Thai cassava farmers preferred the price guarantee policy over the pledging program. Nonetheless, most research studies focus on the benefits received at the farmer stage.
This paper aims to investigate whether the government intervention policy, specifically, the pledging policy has a relationship with the cassava product manufacturers’ financial performance. Financial performance data of starch and ethanol manufacturers during the years when pledging programs were in effect, and the list of cassava product manufacturers who participated in the pledging program were collected. Polynomial regression was employed to investigate the associations between cassava pledging policy and the financial performance of cassava product manufacturers.

2.	LITERATURE REVIEW
Several research studies focused on the impact of the agricultural policy on the benefits of the farmers and on economic impact of the nation as a whole in developing countries. Due to the farmer poverty, government had to intervene to assist farmers in increasing crop price. The papers reviewed will be based on the government intervention policy on agricultural products and the benefits received by the farmers and other related consequences of such policy.
Government intervention policy is intensive in the developing countries. During 2011-2014, Thai government was heavily criticized  for  its  massive  public  spending  of
$3.78 billion for the rice pledging policy, which incurred a loss of $16 billion. Despite large spending, the benefit gained was less than expected as the program aimed to improve the
net income of the farmers. Rice pledging scheme had damaged the Thai rice-milling business, particularly the rice millers that did not participate in the program, as the government sets the price much higher than the market price. The program was also exposed to corruption at every stage. The government had to keep large stock of rice and sold them at a loss. The program was set up mainly for political purposes, rather than for farmers. Laiprakobsup [11], Permani and Vanzetti [14], and Attavanich [4], suggested that government should instead assist farmers in the long run, such as providing supports in terms of fertilizers, harvesting tools, rice seeds, warehouse and even providing low interest loan for farmers.
From the literature reviews, no research has studied the relationship between the pledging policy and financial performance of cassava product manufacturers. This study aims to fill this research gap. Regarding financial performance, one of the most widely used measures of business performance is return on assets (ROA). ROA measures the efficiency of asset management to generate revenue to the company. Research studies that focused on ROA are such as Pasiouras and Kosmidou [13] in banking industry, Aissa and Goaied [1] in modelling hotel profitability and Kitapc et al. [10] in automotive industry.




3.1	Sample and Data Collection




from   the   Public   Warehouse   Organization (PWO), Ministry of Commerce, Thailand.

3.2	Dependent Variable, Research Variable and Control Variable
This study used the growth in ROA from year 2012 to 2013 as dependent variable. This is because the pledging prices are different from 2012 to 2013, hence, the growth in ROA from 2012 to 2013 would measure the change in financial performance of the companies that joined the program in 2013. Therefore, the research variable of interest is a variable that indicates whether or not a manufacturer joined the pledging program.
In addition, the control variables used in the model are estimated from the manufacturers’ financial performance data, including cash ratio, inventory turnover, fixed assets turnover, total assets turnover, debt ratio, account payable turnover, payable deferral period, and debt to equity ratio from year 2009-2013. The summary of the variable is shown in Table 1 below.

3.3	Hypothesis Testing and Regression Modelling
To test the relationship between pledging policy and financial performance of cassava product manufacturers, the hypothesis can be stated as follow:

H0:   There is no association between cassava product manufacturers’ financial
performance and participation in pledging program.
H1: There is significant association between cassava product manufacturers’ financial performance and participation pledging program.

The polynomial regression model contains the research variable and a set of control variables and their interaction terms. The interaction terms are included in order to remedy the lack-of-fits and model assumptions, i.e. normality and constant variance of the residuals. The full model that represents the relationship between the response and the research variable is as shown below:

ROA = β0 + β1PSt + β2CRt + β3Invt + β4Fixedt
+ β5TATt + β6DRt + β7APTt+ β8PDPt + β9DERt
+ β10PSt * CRt  + β11  PSt  * PSt  + βnDERt-5 * DERt-5 + 

where:
PSt is the indicator variable indicating whether or not the manufacturers join the pledging program in 2013.
CRt is cash ratio, cash over liability.
Invt is inventory turnover, cost of goods sold over average inventory.
Fixedt is fixed asset turnover, net sales over fixed asset.
TATt is total assets turnover, sales over total assets.



















Manufacturers who join cassava pledging program in 2013 (PS)

Control variable





Cash ratio (CR)	Cash / Current liability
Inventory turnover (Inv)	Cost of goods sold / Average inventory
Fixed assets turnover (Fixed)	Net sales / Fixed asset
Total assets turnover (TAT)	Sales / Total assets
Debt ratio (DR)	Total debts / Total assets
Account payables turnover (APT)	Cost of goods sold / Average payable
Payable deferral period (PDP)	Payables / (Cost of goods sold / 365)





APTt is an account payables turnover, cost of goods sold over account payable.
PDPt is payable deferral period, payables over (cost of goods sold / 365).
DERt is debt to equity ratio, total debt over total assets.
is an error term.
T is period, from 1 to 5 (2009–2013).

Normality and constant variance of residuals are tested, and indicate no violation in the assumptions. A final reduced model is then fitted using the stepwise regression. The final model contains only the research and the control variables, and their interactions, which are significant with p-value less than 0.05, to help describing the variability in the growth in ROA. The final model is also hierarchical such that the lower order terms of a significant are kept in the model regardless of their p-values.

4.	RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Model results are shown in Table 2. The research variable of interest, PS, is significant with p-value of 0.030. Its positive coefficient of 0.0463 indicates that the government pledging program is positively associated with growth in the ROA for both tapioca and ethanol manufacturers that participated in the program; even though the average pledging
price in 2013 is slightly lower than 2012. Thus, a null hypothesis can be rejected.

5.	CONCLUSIONS





Growth in ROA = -0.0695 + 0.0463PS – 0.0963 CR3 + 0.1089 CR4 + 0.000122 Inv3
+ 0.001352 Inv4 – 0.2089 TAT4 + 0.2499 DR4 – 0.2503 DR5 – 0.00265 PDP3 – 0.002661 PDP4
– 0.003705 DER1 + 0.04009 TAT4*TAT4 + 0.000018 PDP4*PDP4 + 0.00374 DR5*PDP3


























This study is a continuing work from “the Study of Supply Chain in Cassava Trading System for Stakeholders’ Equity” project, supported by Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Nonthaburi.
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